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THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT
AND GOVERNMENT UNDER THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
by
John Mitchell Finnis

Dr Finnis, Rhodes Reader in the Laws of the British
Commonwealth and the United States, University of
Oxford, and a Fellow of University College, Oxford, was
a Tutor in the Faculty of Law, the University of
Adelaide, in 1962 and a Visiting Lecturer in 1966 and
1971.

Perhaps, by the time we celebrate our Law School's
residual constitutional links between the United Kingdom
will have been severed.' In that case, this will be an
history. Still, that history has some enduring political and
interest. Indeed, it cannot be understood at all unless one

centenary, the
and Australia
essay in legal
jurisprudential
bears in mind

that the constitution (small "c") includes not only the law that judges can

I On 25 June 1982 the Premiers' Conference adopted the following Resolution:
"I. That the present constitutional arrangements between the United Kingdom and
Australia affecting the Commonwealth and the States should be brought into
conformity with the status of Australia as a sovereign and independent nation.
2. That the necessary measures be taken to sever the remaining constitutional links
(other than the Crown), in particular those existing in relation to the following
matters:
(i) The sovereignty, if any, of the United Kingdom Parliament over Australian
matters, Commonwealth and State;
(ii) Subordination of State Parliaments to United Kingdom legislation still
applying as part of the law of the States;
(iii) The power of the Crown to disallow Commonwealth and State legislation;
(iv) Appeals to the Privy Council from State Supreme Courts on State matters;
(v) The marks of colonial status remaining in the Instructions to the GovernorGeneral and to State Governors.
3. That at the same time as the residual links are removed, any limitation on the extraterritorial competence of the States to legislate for their peace, order and good
government be removed.
4. That the measures to be taken are to include simultaneous and parallel
Commonwealth legislation at the request of the States pursuant to s 51(xxxviii) of
the Constitution and United Kingdom legislation at the request of and with the
consent of the Commonwealth, that request being made and that consent being given
with the concurrence of the States, such legislation to come into effect
simultaneously.
5. That the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General be instructed to prepare the
necessary draft legislation to implement the above matters."
At the date of writing (September 1982), much remains to be done before the
Resolution can be put into effect. And, of course, the Resolution signally fails to deal
with the residual responsibilities of United Kingdom ministers in relation to the
appointment of State Governors and the amendment of State Letters Patent and
Instructions to Governors. This important gap in the Resolution is a consequence of
disagreement between Commonwealth ministers and the States' ministers about the
appropriate channel of advice to the Queen concerning appointment of State Governors.
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declare and enforce on the motion of litigants, but also the conventions
that responsible ministers and legislatures (all those persons whom I will
call
"authorities")
acknowledge
as
authoritative
and
binding.
"Constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total
Constitution of the country." 2
Moreover, the "Australian constitution" of which I am speaking is not
the Constitution of the Commonwealth set out in s 9 of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. Rather, it is that
constitutional structure, and those constitutional processes, in which are
included not only that Constitution and the Constitutions of the States
but also all the principles and conventions that regulate the working of
each of those Constitutions within its own field and inter se. So this is
an essay in federalism, rather than colonialism or imperialism. It relates
to principles that will retain their relevance after the responsibilities of
United Kingdom authorities have been terminated.
The Independence of Australia
The Commonwealth of Australia is now an independent realm. It
attained independence and fully responsible status within Her Majesty's
Dominions perhaps in or before 1926 (the "Balfour Declaration"),
perhaps in 1931 (the Statute of Westminster 1931), perhaps in 1939
(when the Statute of Westminster 1931 is deemed to have been adopted),
perhaps in 1942 (when the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942
was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament). 3 But the fact of
attainment of independence is not in doubt. It was given statutory
recognition in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth instruments
regulating the styles and titles adopted by Her Majesty in 1953.
But this undoubted independence has never been treated by the United
Kingdom authorities as, of itself, terminating their responsibilities. For,
as we shall see, a continuation of those responsibilities was expressly and
impliedly requested and consented to by the Australian authorities at the
time when independence was attained, and was presupposed by the legal
instruments which acknowledged and gave effect to that independence. A
similar (not identical) request was made by the Canadian authorities in
1931. So the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, in
1981, knew that it was making a statement of some general import when
it said that "The UK Parliament's powers in relation to the Canadian
constitution can be reconciled with Canada's sovereign independence only
if they are exercised in accord with constitutional requirements". 4
2 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1981) 125 DLR (3d) 1, 87
(Sup Ct of Canada (not following my convention regarding the small "c")).
3 In Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177, Barwick CJ dated the independence of
Australia to "at or since the passage of the Statute of Westminster (Imp) in 1931" (at
189), while Windeyer J appears to have treated the Statute as decisive (at 223f). Barwick
CJ subsequently altered his views; in China Ocean Shipping Co v South Australia (1979)
27 ALR 1, 8 he seems to have dated independence at "some period of time subsequent
to the passage and adoption of the Statute of Westminster". In Southern Centre of
Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1979) 27 ALR 59, 65 Gibbs J appears to have treated
the adoption of the Statute of Westminster as decisive.
4 UK, Parl, British North American Acts: the Role of Parliament, First Report of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, HC Paper 42 (1980-1981) xii; see also paras 7, 85, 86, 88,
95, 103. This Report was unanimous; the Committee, a Standing Committee of the
House, comprised six Conservative and five Labour members, including former Ministers
of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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United Kingdom Opinion at the Time of Australia's Independence
The opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1981 conformed,
substantially and consciously, 5 to the opinion of a weightier committee
which considered these matters in 1935, in the very wake (or, perhaps, in
the very midst) of the processes of recognising and accomplishing the
independence of the Commonwealth of Australia. The report of the Joint
Committee on the Petition of Western Australia 6 is of particular value,
not only for itself, but also because it records verbatim the argument of
counsel on all aspects of my topic.
In 1934 the State of Western Australia petitioned the King and the
Houses of Parliament for the enactment of a statute "to effectuate the
withdrawal of the people of Western Australia from the Federal
Commonwealth of Australia". The Secretary of State for the Dominions,
on behalf of His Majesty, sought the advice of the Law Officers, which
was to the effect that, while such an enactment would be within the legal
powers of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, it would nevertheless,
as "legislation with regard to the constituent members of the Federation
forming the Commonwealth of Australia", require, "as a matter of
of the Commonwealth
the concurrence
practice",
constitutional
Government. To consider the propriety of receiving the Petition, the
House of Lords and the House of Commons appointed a Joint Select
Committee: Viscount Goschen, Lord Ker (the Marquess of Lothian),
Lord Wright (a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary), Mr Leo Amery, Mr Isaac
Foot and Mr Lunn. The Committee heard elaborate arguments of
counsel for the petitioners (Prof J H Morgan KC) and for the
Commonwealth of Australia (Wilfrid Greene), which examined in detail
all aspects of the law, convention, usage and practice concerning the
relations between the States, the Commonwealth and the United
Kingdom. The conclusion of the Joint Committee was the same as that
of the Law Officers: although the legislation prayed for would be within
the legal competence of the United Kingdom Parliament, it would be
outside its jurisdiction and competence as defined by the established
constitutional convention; moreover, the State of Western Australia, as
such, had no locus standi in asking for legislation from the United
Kingdom Parliament in regard to the constitution of the Commonwealth.
The four principles on which the foregoing conclusion rests were fully
stated by the Joint Committee in its report. The first principle is that
"the abstract right of Parliament to legislate for the whole Empire [is]
only exercised, in relation to the affairs of the Dominions, in accordance
with certain ... clearly understood constitutional principles, principles to
which Parliament has more recently given its formal and statutory
approval in the Statute of Westminster". 7 The second principle is more
particular:
"It is ... a well established convention of the constitutional practice governing the relations between the
Parliament of the United Kingdom and other Parliaments
of the Empire, that the Parliament of the United

5 Ibid paras 8, 93,

104.

6 UK, Parl, Petition of the State of Western Australia: Report from the Joint Committee
of the House of Lords and the House of Commons, HC Paper 88 (1935).
7 Ibid vi. Note that in 1935 the Statute of Westminster 1931, save for ss 2-6, extended to
Australia: see Lord Wright's statement - ibid 133.

THE

ADELAIDE

LAW

REVIEW

Kingdom should not interfere in the affairs of a
Dominion or self-governing State or Colony, save at the
request of the Government or Parliament of such
Dominion, State or Colony, that is to say, in effect that
interference should only take place at the request of such
Dominion, State or Colony speaking with the voice which
represents it as a whole and not merely at the request of
a minority. That rule was well established before 1900,
and has been consistently acted upon as an undoubted
Constitutional Convention ... [and] must be regarded as
fundamental in these matters." I
The references in this passage to "self-governing States" must be
understood as concerning primarily (more probably exclusively) the States
of Australia, as six constitutional units distinct from the Commonwealth
of Australia as a seventh constitutional unit exercising powers of
government over the same geographical area (also known as the
Commonwealth of Australia), 9 within what Dixon J would call a
"Federal system by which two governments of the Crown are established
within the same territory, neither superior to the other".1"
The third principle enunciated by the Joint Committee concerned the
foregoing distinction between the constitutional units carrying on the
Crown's government in Australia:
"The establishment of the Commonwealth, in fact, set
up, within the geographical limits of Australia, an allpervading division of powers between the Commonwealth,
on the one hand, as a separate and integral national
authority covering the whole area of Australia, sovereign
within the ambit of its powers, and the States, on the
other hand, as political entities within that area, each
State sovereign within the ambit of its respective powers.
Both Commonwealth and States are equally independent
in respect of the powers and functions severally assigned
to them. This division is one which, in the opinion of
the Committee, cannot be ignored in considering the
application
of the general constitutional principles
governing the intervention in the affairs of any selfgoverning member of the British Empire." "

8 Ibid viii. Emphasis added.
9 Since the Crown is sovereign in, and as part of the constitutions of, each of the seven
constitutional units in Australia, and not merely in respect of the Commonwealth
considered as one of those seven, the royal style and title adopted by Australia, both in
1953 and in 1973, avoids the ambiguity by styling Her Majesty not Queen of the
Commonwealth of Australia but Queen of Australia: Royal Style and Titles Act 1953
(C'th); Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (C'th).
10 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of E 0 Farley Ltd (1940) 63
CLR 278, 312.

11 Supra n 6 at ix. Emphasis added. Lord Wright substantially repeated this analysis in
giving the judgment of the Judicial Committee in James v Commonwealth (1936) AC
578, 611; 55 CLR 1, 41:

"the powers of the States were left unaffected by the Constitution except in so
far as the contrary was expressly provided; subject to that each State remained
sovereign within its own sphere. The powers of the State within those limits are
as plenary as are the powers of the Commonwealth."
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One could make verbal refinements to this analysis of the constitutional
structure of Australia.'" But in substance it is neither defective nor
have13 said
authority
Australians of unimpeachable
exaggerated.
substantially the same - Dixon J and Evatt J, to mention two.
The fourth principle enunciated by the Joint Committee in 1935 is a
deduction from the three principles already set out:
"It is clearly only at the request of the Government
and Legislature primarily concerned that the Parliament
of the United Kingdom can be entitled to legislate. In
respect of matters appertaining to the Commonwealth, it
could not so legislate without the request of the
in respect of matters
authorities;
Commonwealth
appertaining to the sphere of State powers it could not
so legislate without the request of the State authorities.
The State of Western Australia, as such, has no locus
standi in asking for legislation from the Parliament of
the United Kingdom in regard to the constitution of the
Commonwealth, any more than it would have in asking
for legislation to alter the constitution of another
Australian State, or than the Commonwealth would have
in asking for an amendment of the constitution of the
State of Western Australia." I4
This finding of the Joint Committee affords clear guidance on the
question of the proper source of advice to Her Majesty on State matters
generally.
The Adoption of the Statute of Westminster
But is the 1935 Joint Committee report superseded by the
Commonwealth's adoption of the Statute of Westminster in 1942? The
answer must be: No. The language of the 1935 report has an archaic
ring, from time to time. But the substance of its argument is unaffected
by later events. Consider the following five points.
(i) Immediately after the sentences
Committee's report proceeds:

last

quoted

above,

the

Joint

"This distinction is recognised and enforced in the Statute
of Westminster. The Preamble to that Statute reaffirms
the established rule that the Parliament of the United
Kingdom will not pass any law extending to a Dominion,
as part of the law of that Dominion, otherwise than at
Wales v Commonwealth (No 1) (1932) 46 CLR 155, 220 Evat i
(dissenting) noted that there is an ambiguity in attributing sovereignty to a State (or to
the Commonwealth) itself: "In some aspects, both the States and the Commonwealth are
bodies which may lawfully exercise sovereign powers. The Governors of the States are as
much the representatives of His Majesty for State purposes as the Governor-General of
the Commonwealth is for Commonwealth purposes . . For all purposes of selfgovernment in Australia, sovereignty is distributed between the Commonwealth and the
States . . . For the purposes of judicial process in this Court, although the States are
not sovereign bodies, neither is the Commonwealth."
13 See text and footnotes supra n 10 and infra nn 21-23. See also Broken Hill South Ltd v
Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (1937) 56 CLR 337, 378 per Evatt J:
"constitutionally speaking, the status of the States of Australia is equal to, or coordinate with, that of the Commonwealth itself."
14 Supra n 6 at ix. Emphasis added.
12 In New South
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the request of that Dominion; the Statute is there dealing
solely with Dominion affairs. But in section 9(2) the
Statute provides for the case of the States, by enacting
that the Parliament of the United Kingdom may deal
with respect to any matters within the authority of the
States of Australia, without any concurrence of the
Commonwealth, that is, it may deal with such matters at
the request of the States." 11
(ii) The Secretary of State for the Dominions stated by Written
Answer to the House of Commons on 1 December 1931 that the Statute
of Westminster was "designed to maintain the existing constitutional
position in relation to the Australian States". 6 This assurance was
communicated by the Secretary of State to the States by direct
communication as well as through the medium of the Commonwealth
Government."7 A similar assurance was formally repeated by the
Commonwealth Government in nearly identical terms in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate in 1931: "The rights of the States with
regard to the maintenance of their constitutional powers are also
therefore fully safeguarded." 18
(iii) Express safeguards were, however, inserted into the Statute:
"s.8 Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to confer any power
to repeal or alter the Constitution or the Constitution
Act of the Commonwealth of Australia . . . otherwise
than in accordance with the law existing before the
commencement of this Act.
s.9(l)Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorize the
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia to make
laws on any matter within the authority of the States of
Australia, not being a matter within the authority of the
Parliament or Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia.
s.9(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to require the
concurrence of the Parliament or Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia in any law made by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom with respect to any
matter within the authority of the States of Australia,
not being a matter within the authority of the Parliament
or Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, in
any case where it would have been in accordance with
the
constitutional
practice
existing
before
the
commencement of this Act that the Parliament of the
United Kingdom should make that law without such
concurrence."
(iv) It is important to bear in mind that ss 9(1) and 9(2) were inserted
at the request of the Government and Parliament of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth further requested (again with the full support of the
15 Ibid. Emphasis aaced.
16 UK, Pan, Debates, HC (1931) vol 260, col 954.
17 See Report of Foreign Affairs Committee, supra n 4 at para 104.
18 Aust, Parl, Debates (1931) vol 130, 3420 (HR); vol 131, 4503(S).
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Opposition) the inclusion of a clause to the effect that nothing in the
Statute should be deemed "to authorise the Parliament or Government of
the Commonwealth, without the concurrence of the Parliament and
Government of the States concerned, to request or consent to the
enactment of any Act by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on any
matter which is within the authority of the States of Australia, not being
a matter within the authority of the Parliament or Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia". The United Kingdom Government refused
to propose to the United Kingdom Parliament the enactment of this
clause.' 9 In consequent correspondence between the Commonwealth
Government (which rightly maintained that the proposed clause had a
distinct and appropriate purpose) and the United Kingdom Government,
it emerged that the legal advisers to the United Kingdom Government
thought the proposed clause unnecessary. They considered that its
insertion would be a mistake from the point of view of the States that insertion of the clause would suggest that s 4 of the Statute of
Westminster might be construed as applying to the States. They further
considered (as is stated and supported by Wilfrid Greene arguing for the
Commonwealth before the Joint Committee in 1935) "that it would be
wrong ... and absurd to include in the Bill the provision that the
Commonwealth Parliament or Commonwealth Government shall not do
something that it would . .. be unconstitutionalfor them to do without
any such provision".20
(v) In moving and supporting the Statute of Westminster Adoption Bill
in the Commonwealth Parliament, Dr Evatt (then Attorney-General in
the [Labor] Commonwealth Government) gave to both the Houses formal
and repeated assurances, both orally and in writing, that the position of
the States would not be "in any way affected" either in law or in
constitutional practice.2 1 He stated that it was unnecessary to include in
the preamble or otherwise any declaration corresponding to the clause
proposed in 1931 but rejected by the United Kingdom Government, for
(he stated) even if some such request and consent were put forward by
the Commonwealth Government and Parliament "in respect of a matter
that really came within the jurisdiction of a State ... the Imperial
Parliament would not enact the legislation". 2 2 Our right to23 request, he
said, should be "limited to matters within our jurisdiction".
19 Notice the willingness of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament to exercise a

constitutionally regulated discretion to reject both the advice of the Commonwealth
Government and the request of that Government and the Commonwealth Parliament.
This became significant in 1981, when the Canadian Government's claim that the United
Kingdom authorities were bound to act on a Canadian request was rejected by the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons: see Report, supra n 4 at paras

92, 93.
20 Supra n 6 at 110. Emphasis added. The opinion is reported in a letter from the AgentGeneral for South Australia to the Agent-General for Victoria, dated 2 December 1931,
and is Appendix F to Bailey, The Statute of Westminster 1931 (1935); and see ibid
11-18.
21 Aust, ParI, Debates (1942)

vol 172,

1396, 1476,

1568,

1569 (HR). In 1936, Evatt J

stated: "Itis quite clear, in my opinion, that its [the Statute of Westminster's] adoption
by Australia cannot affect in any way whatsoever the existing legal and constitutional
rights of the States in relation to those of the Commonwealth. Indeed the express
safeguarding by the Statute of the position of the States of Australia was quite
unnecessary." - (1936) 10 ALJ (Supp) 96, 107.
22 Ibid 1396.
[Mr Menzies] introduced one of the two bills
23 Dr Evatt - "Some years ago, when ...
[for the adoption of the Statute of Westminster] that he brought in, one or two of the
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In the debates in 1931, the Attorney-General in the [Labor]
Commonwealth Government had similarly recognised the constitutional
propriety of a refusal by the United Kingdom Parliament to accede to
24
such a request by the Commonwealth Parliament.
The Position as at Independence: a Summary
All this establishes some important points. At the time when the
Commonwealth of Australia became independent, it was peacefully
accepted by all concerned that the Commonwealth Government and
Parliament do not have exclusive responsibility for the government of
Australia. It was further accepted that for the United Kingdom
authorities to give exclusive or overriding weight to the advice of the
Commonwealth on all Australian matters would be to defeat the clear
constitutional understandings accepted since 1900. The attainment of
independence by the Commonwealth was intended not to, and did not in
fact, disturb the balance of Federal-State relations insofar as those
relations depended and depend on the co-operation of the United
Kingdom authorities. And it was accepted that the United Kingdom
authorities have a constitutionally regulated discretion to reject advice
tendered to them by State or Commonwealth ministers, and ought to
reject such advice whenever, in the judgment of the United Kingdom
authorities, acceptance of the advice would disturb the constitutionally
established balance between State and Commonwealth powers and
instrumentalities.
Since 1900 the relations between the United Kingdom authorities and
the Commonwealth authorities have changed. In particular, the United
Kingdom has, since at latest 1926, no residual responsibility for the
external affairs or defence of the Commonwealth; and the GovernorGeneral no longer represents the United Kingdom Government in any
23 Cont.
States said that they did not like section 4, without a preamble in the adopting
legislation to the effect that the Commonwealth would not ask the Imperial Parliament
for legislation in respect of a matter that really came within the jurisdiction of a State.
My answer to that would be, first, that the Parliament of this country would not make
such a request; and secondly, that if itdid, the Imperial Parliament would not enact the
legislation ... Yesterday, I received from the Premier of Victoria a letter in which he
again" (but note that this is in fact a novel suggestion, dubious for the reasons about
to be stated by Dr Evatt) "suggested that there should be inserted, not in the section,
but in the preamble, a provision to the effect that it would not be in accordance with
practice that the Commonwealth should make such a request, unless the matter were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. Of course, I do not think that
the House should adopt such a formula. Our right to request should not be limited to
matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, but to matters within our jurisdiction .. . This
bill will not in any way disturb the balance of powers between the Commonwealth and
the States. That can be altered only by the people acting under section 128 of the
Constitution." - ibid 1396f.
24 Mr Brennan A-G:"The honourable member for Corangamite (Mr Crouch) appears to be very earnest in
the advocacy of this amendment, but there is one vital objection to his proposal, and
that is that the Parliament of the United Kingdom would not entertain it for a moment.
It is proposed in the amendment to ask the Parliament of the United Kingdom to pass
a statute which would have the effect of declaring that any law passed by the
Commonwealth Parliament would thereupon run, whatever the rights or claims of the
States might be ... I do not believe, however, that the Parliament of the United
Kingdom could be induced to take such action, in view of our declaration that we do
not intend this resolution [requesting and consenting to the enactment of the Statute of
Westminster] to interfere with the rights of the States." - Aust, Parl, Debates (1931)
vol 131, 4492 (HR).
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way. Since 1900, too, the relations between the United Kingdom
Government and each of the Australian States have perhaps changed,
inasmuch as it was not until 1926 that the United Kingdom Government
made it clear beyond peradventure that "it would not be proper for the
Secretary of State to issue instructions to
the Governor with regard to
2
the exercise of his constitutional duties".
What has not changed since 1900 is the responsibility of the United
Kingdom Government - both under United Kingdom law insofar as it
extends to Australia as part of Australian law, and as a vital element in
the comity existing between the two independent realms - to ensure
that, insofar as constitutional laws in force in Australia require the cooperation of United Kingdom authorities, that co-operation will be
forthcoming only in accordance with constitutional requirements
concerning the division of authority in Australia between Commonwealth
and States. The performance of this responsibility by the United
Kingdom authorities may, in particular cases, require of those authorities
an independent assessment of the constitutional propriety of
representations made to them by Commonwealth or State Governments.
Her Majesty's ministers in the United Kingdom no longer, in relation
to Australian affairs, have any responsibility for tendering advice to the
Crown as "the central authority of .

.

. the Empire". For in relation to

Australian affairs there is no Imperial centre of authority outside the
seven-fold constitutional structure of the independent realm of Australia.
Thus the residual and indeed anomalous role of United Kingdom
ministers and instrumentalities, in relation to Australian affairs not
affecting the United Kingdom as such, is essentially marked out by the
distribution of powers and responsibilities which is established and
effected by the various Australian Constitutions and constitutional laws
and conventions. The responsibility of United Kingdom ministers or
authorities, insofar as they are advising or acting for the Crown in right
of the Commonwealth of Australia or the Crown in right of (and as part
of the constitution of) an Australian State, 26 is a responsibility to be
discharged in accordance with the distinctive features of the seven-fold
Australian constitutional order, in which order (save as to "external
affairs") no one constitutional unit represents Australia or the Crown in
right of the independent territory called the Commonwealth of Australia.
In short, in advising or acting for the Crown as to, say, the appointment
of a Governor of an Australian State, United Kingdom authorities stand
in a relation to Australia which is essentially neither an "Imperial" nor
an "external" relation.

25 NSW, Parl, Papers (1926) vol 1, 318; Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors: A
Study of the Reserve Powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions (1936)
127-129. It would be a mistake to suppose that, during the last fifty years or more,
State Governors in doubt about the extent of their powers have tended to seek guidance
from London.
26 As the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of South Australia on 15 April 1903:
"The Crown undoubtedly remains part of the Constitution of South Australia, and in
matters affecting it in that capacity the proper channel of communication is between the
Secretary of State and the State Governor." Cd 1587, 25 para 8. It is not the practice
for communications by a State Governor on matters of State law (including the State
constitution) either to go via the Governor-General or to be referred back to him for
advice.
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The "External Affairs" Power of the Commonwealth
Can it be argued that the responsibility of the Commonwealth
Government for the conduct of the external affairs of Australia, and the
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws (subject to the
Constitution) with respect to external affairs [Constitution s 51(xxix)],
confer on that Government and that Parliament a constitutional right
both to make requests to the United Kingdom authorities in respect of
the exercise by those authorities of their constitutional functions in
relation to the States, and to have such requests acceded to as a matter
of comity between the United Kingdom and Australia? The answer, I
suggest, is plainly: No.
(i) The Joint Committee of 1935 heard elaborate argument of counsel
on both sides with regard to the external affairs power of the
Commonwealth 7 and was fully appraised of the ambit of that power
when it arrived at the aforementioned conclusion that the Commonwealth
would have no locus standi in asking for an amendment of the
constitution of the State of Western Australia.
(ii) When Dr Evatt gave the aforementioned assurances to the
Commonwealth Parliament in 1942 he spoke as one who supported the
widest possible view of the ambit of the Commonwealth's external affairs
power. 28 In particular Dr Evatt expressly held the view that "the phrase
'external affairs' was adopted [in s 51(xxix)] in preference to 'foreign
affairs', so as to make it clear that the relationship between the
Commonwealth and other parts of the British Empire, as well as the
relationship between the Commonwealth and foreign countries, was to be
comprehended". 29 This view, that relations between the United Kingdom
of the
within the responsibility
and the Commonwealth are
Commonwealth Government and in some sense within the power of the
Commonwealth Parliament, is generally accepted. It has been expressed,
3°
and by Wilfrid
for example, by Latham CJ with clarity and emphasis,
Committee.31
Joint
Greene for the Commonwealth before the 1935
Others have clearly implied it, for example Griffith CJ and Barton J in
3
McKelvey v Meagher (1906),32 and Dixon J in R v Sharkey (1949).1 But
those who have expressed this view have seen with equal clarity that the
fact that the Commonwealth Government has relations with the United
Kingdom which are "external" relations in no way entails either that
there are no aspects of those relations which are regulated by
constitutional principles binding on the United Kingdom authorities, or
that all the relations of United Kingdom authorities to Australian matters
are "external" relations. That is, they have all been aware of the relevant
distinction: the fact that the making by the Commonwealth of a treaty
with the United Kingdom is an external affair does not in any way entail
that when Her Majesty appoints a State Governor she exercises a power
"external" to Australia or engages in any "external affair", simply
because she happens to be outside Australia at the time or takes the

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Supra n 6 at 94-98, 103, 123-125.
See R v Burgess, ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 681-684.
Ibid 684.
Ibid 643 and later in R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 136.
Supra n 6 at 98.
(1906) 4 CLR 265, 278, 286.
Supra n 30 at 149.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LINKS WITH

BRITAIN

advice of ministers outside Australia. To hold otherwise would involve
absurd consequences, such as that Her Majesty is engaged in an affair
external to Australia when she issues a Commission to a GovernorGeneral. Such functions, although performed geographically outside
Australia, are essentially internal affairs, regulated by the various
Australian constitutions which regulate Her Majesty's powers with respect
to Australian (State and Commonwealth) affairs.
That is why the very same authorities who expressed a view of the
"external affairs" power as comprehending Commonwealth - United
Kingdom relations were able to refer to the constitutional principles
regulating those relations as, within their scope, binding and effective.
Thus Dr Evatt was able to express the aforementioned views on the
position of the States after the Statute of Westminster, and was able to
give the assurances I have referred to. Likewise, Mr Latham was able to
state: "The States ... are unaffected by this legislation [the Statute of
Westminster]. They are entitled to preserve such relations as they like
with the British Parliament. We" (the Commonwealth Parliament, in
which he was then Leader of the Opposition) "do not control the
relations between the States and the rest of the Empire." 14 Indeed
Latham CJ could see and assert that the fact that "external affairs"
include Commonwealth - United Kingdom relations is wholly consistent
with the circumstance that "The Government and Constitution of the
United Kingdom and the Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom
of the
are also part of the legal and political constitution
Commonwealth". 35 And likewise, Wilfrid Greene in 1935 maintained
before the Joint Committee both (a) that for the purposes of the
relationships with external bodies the Imperial
Commonwealth's
Government and legislature is an external body, and (b) that Mr
Latham's view that the Commonwealth does not control the relations
between the States and the rest of the Empire, including the United
Kingdom Parliament, was an "absolutely accurate" view (as referring to
"those purely State matters in respect of which the States have got that
independent relationship") .36
(iii) Precisely the same view of the external affairs power has been
3
held and maintained by the United Kingdom Government since 1902,
and has never been thought in any way incompatible with the solemn
and repeated assurances by that Government that it considers its relations
with Australia to be regulated by the constitutional rules and principles
enshrined in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the

34
35
36
37

Supra n 24 at 4065.
R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 136.
Supra n 6 at 98, 106.
For example, the Secretary of State's despatch of 25 November 1902 to the Governor of
South Australia: "By the Act [the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (1900)]
a new State or nation was created, armed with paramount power not only to settle the
more important internal affairs relating to the common interest of the united people,
but also to deal with all political matters arising between them and any other part of

the Empire ... the external responsibility of Australia, except in regard to certain
matters in respect of which a later date was fixed by the Constitution, vested
immediately in the Commonwealth, which was armed with the paramount power
necessary to discharge it." - Cd 1587, 25 (quoted to the Joint Committee of 1935 by
counsel for the Commonwealth: supra n 6 at 95).
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Statute of Westminster and by the other constitutional instruments, and
38
indeed the constitutional status of the respective Australian States.
(iv) As I have argued, the matter is not essentially affected by the
undoubted independence of the Commonwealth of Australia. From the
point of view of the United Kingdom authorities, the Commonwealth of
Australia has been an essentially independent realm since at latest 1926.
During the half century since then, Her Majesty's ministers in the United
Kingdom have continued to perform constitutional functions in relation
to Australia; for instance, to advise Her Majesty in 39 respect of the
appointment of the Governors of the Australian States.
Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the comity existing between the
United Kingdom and Australia for Her Majesty's ministers in the United
Kingdom to perform these functions in relation to Australia on any basis
other than strict adherence to the law and practice of the Australian
constitutions (eg to perform them as a matter of the foreign policy of
the United Kingdom). Any other view of the matter leads not only to
the absurdities I have mentioned, but also to the unacceptable result that
at some unspecified date since 1926 the Commonwealth Government and
Parliament acquired a novel power of amending the Constitution of the
Commonwealth (and the constitutions of the States), a power exercisable
by processes of dealing with passive instrumentalities in the United
Kingdom and thus without constitutional control and without proper
opportunity for expression of opinion by the people of the
Commonwealth or the Governments, Parliaments or people of the States.
Both this result and its unacceptability were present to the minds of
those authorities in the United Kingdom and Australia who gave the
assurances already referred to above.
The suggestion that the "external affairs power" of the Commonwealth
affects the questions now under discussion appears to stem from
4
Geoffrey Sawer's article, "The. British Connection" (1973). 0 Sawer's
argument leads him to the conclusion that the external affairs power
"provides a basis for Commonwealth approaches to the U.K. on all
Australian matters." He differentiates this broad and ambiguous

38 See especially Cd 1587 (1903) 12-15, 25; Cd 3340 (1907) 30; Cd 5273 (1910) 9, 13;
Wright, Shadow of Dispute: Aspects of Commonwealth-State Relations 1901-1910 (1970)

ch 1, especially at 47, where Wright paraphrases the Secretary of State's memorandum
to the Governor-General dated 30 March 1911; as to the assurances by the United
Kingdom Government to the States in 1931, see supra at n 20.
39 As the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of South Australia on 9th October
1908, "the evidence of such sovereignty lscil, of the States, unlike the Canadian
provinces] is in part secured by making the appointment of Governor in the same
manner and on the same terms as prior to federation". - Cmd 2683, 43f; the other
parts of this letter, concerning the difference in status between Australian States (and
their Governors) and Canadian provinces (and their Lieutenant Governors) repay study.
The difference was deliberate: see the Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, 1177-1181.
See also the last paragraph of the Secretary of State's letter of 1913, Cmd 2683, 52. On
16 December 1930 the Secretary of State assured the House of Commons that the
procedure relating to State Governors "will continue as before": UK, Parl, Debates, HC
(1930) vol 246, col 1037. And on the wider issues the decisive statement of principle has
always been taken to be that contained in the Secretary of State's message to the
Governor of New South Wales on 31 March 1908: "it was, and is, intended that all
business which has hitherto passed through the State Governors should follow the same
channel unless and until there is formal and constitutional authority for a change of
system"

-

Cd 5237, 9.

40 (1973) 47 ALJ 113, 115-117.
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conclusion (without further argument) into two more pointed conclusions:
that the Commonwealth's "general claim to be heard on Australia's
external relations" entails that "the Commonwealth can be heard by the
U.K. Government to recommend the abolition of the 'State appeals' [to
the Privy Council], in a sense making it politically if not legally
obligatory for the U.K. authorities to take such action", and that
"however matters might have stood in 1900, the State - Westminster
relationship should now be regarded as included within the reach of [the
external affairs power - s 51(xxix) of the Constitution]". None of these
conclusions is in any way warranted by his argument, which contains
only two elements: (a) judicial dicta between 1906 and 1949 which "have
treated Australia - UK relations as within the possible scope of
s 51(xxix)"; and (b) an unexpressed implication that the external affairs
power has materially expanded since 1900.
But, as I have been arguing, the notion that there are "Australia UK relations" which are "within the scope of s 51(xxix)" has been
accepted by everyone since 1902, including all those persons and
authorities whose utterances guarantee and testify to the binding
constitutional principles which form a vital component of United
Kingdom - Australian relationships. And as to his second argument,
Sawer has not pointed to any authority for the notion that the external
affairs power has in any relevant way expanded since 1900, or 1902, or
1906, or 1931, or 1935, or 1942, or 1949 or any other material time; the
external affairs power was accorded the widest ambit by each of the
aforementioned authorities.
There is a savour of paradox or absurdity about any argument, such
as that developed by Sawer, which seeks to prove by reference to judicial
dicta, supposed developments in Australian constitutional law, close
analysis of s 128 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and other
like considerations, that all relations between the United Kingdom and
Australia ought to be conducted as "external" relations in the sense that
they should be conducted as a matter of foreign policy and not in
accordance with constitutional principles. For if those relations were
merely "external", constitutional arguments whether subtle or simple
would have no place.
The truth of the matter, I suggest, is this. An essential component of
the comity, with which the "external" relations between the United
Kingdom and Australia are and are to be conducted, is precisely that the
United Kingdom Government and Parliament, as the repositories of
undoubted legal and constitutional powers to affect the law in force in
Australia, should exercise those powers strictly in accordance with the
laws and conventions which are their very source.
Are There Matters of Exclusively State Concern?
Treating all these historically grounded constitutional principles and
understandings as of no account, the Solicitor-General of the
Commonwealth has recently claimed that there are no matters or topics
41
He falls short of claiming
that affect only an Australian State.
41 See letter from Mr Byers QC in (1982) 56 ALJ 316-318. It will be observed that
although the Solicitor-General's letter sets out to deal with the question whether there is
a convention that the Queen will not act on matters which affect both States and
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Kingdom ministers never have constitutional
Crown on Australian matters. But he insinuates
been advanced clearly enough by Murphy J.43
on two arguments.

The first is this:
"the Commonwealth Parliament, at State request, could
abolish, under s.51, pl.(xxxviii) of the Constitution
appeals to the Privy Council, and very well may be able
to do so under other powers . . . If the topic is, or may
be, within Commonwealth legislative or executive power,
how may that topic afford an illustration of the
suggested convention [scil that the Queen will not act on
Commonwealth advice in exclusively State matters]?" 44

This appeal to s 51(xxxviii) is a weak ground for rejecting the
constitutional position so clearly reflected in s 9 of the Statute of
Westminster, not to mention the surrounding events and dicta chronicled
earlier in this essay: that there are matters "within the authority of the
States of Australia, not being . . . matter(s) within the authority of the
Parliament or Government of the Commonwealth of Australia". Section
51 (xxxviii) confers no authority on the Commonwealth Parliament over
any matter unless and until a condition is fulfilled: that "all the States
directly concerned" have requested or concurred in the exercise of such
power. The Commonwealth has no authority to require or compel or
control the fulfilling of that condition. Thus no matter falls within

41 Cont.
Commonwealth unless all Governments are in agreement, many of his arguments and
sallies are in fact directed against the related but distinct contention that there is a
convention that the Queen will not act on exclusively State matters when the
Commonwealth alone asks her to do so. Mr Byers' letter is to be read together with
letters from himself and others in (1981) 55 ALJ 360f, 701f (Saunders and Smith), 763f
(Solicitor-General for Queensland), 829f (Finnis), 893 (Attorney-General of South
Australia). The careful reader of my letter will not, I think, accept any of the rebuttals
and imputations directed against it by Mr Byers.
42 Not only by the contention mentioned in the text, but by the ambiguious half-truth that
"The Queen, as Queen of Australia, is Australia's constitutional Head of State. As such
Her Majesty acts on Australian advice" - (1982) 56 ALJ 316, 318. By the phrase "as
such", he avoids commenting on the statement of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office on 28 November 1980: "To the extent that the Australian States remain selfgoverning dependencies of the British Crown, the United Kingdom authorities would
consider a request from a State for United Kingdom legislation on any matter which
affected no other Australian State and/or the Commonwealth of Australia." - quoted
in 55 ALJ at 829. The phrase that I have emphasised is, of course, a stark way of
expressing the point more conventionally put in the terms used by the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 21 December 1976 (repeated by the FCO on
11 November 1980): "United Kingdom Ministers are at present responsible for advising
Her Majesty the Queen on certain matters affecting the Australian States ... [as] a direct
consequence of the established Australian constitutional position ... " - quoted in 55
ALJ at 829. Even if the States are dependencies of the British Crown, they are also
components intrinsic to the realm of Australia, and their constitutional affairs are not
external to that realm.
43 Commonwealth v Queensland (1975) 134 CLR 298, 335; cf 55 ALJ at 830. Murphy J's
opinion on this matter is part and parcel of a wider view of his concerning the
constitutional relationship of Australia and United Kingdom instrumentalities, a view
rejected comprehensively by the High Court in China Ocean Shipping Co v South
Australia (1979) 27 ALR I and Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia
(1979) 27 ALR 59.
44 See letter from Mr Byers QC in (1982) 56 ALJ 316, 317.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LINKS

WITH

BRITAIN

Commonwealth authority by reason of s 51(xxxviii) alone unless and
until a State or States bring it into the range of Commonwealth
authority by their request or concurrence. Section 51(xxxviii) is evidence,
if anything, of the limitation of Commonwealth authority.
Mr Byers' second argument is this:
"The notion that there are specific heads of power
granted or reserved to the States underpins the suggested
convention. Sir Owen Dixon observed that the notion was
a fallacy . . . It is not only difficult to agree the matters
falling only within State power, . . . it is impossible to

do so. No convention on so shaky a base could survive.
None exists. . . It is a fundamental constitutional error to
regard the legislative powers of the States as if they
comprised specific subject-matters .

.

. How then can it

be said of any topic, even, for example, alterations to
State Constitutions, that it affects only the States? The
suggested convention ... requires one to assume such a
reservation [of power to the States], and to do so
contradicts the Constitition." 41
But in the very paragraph in which Sir Owen Dixon first enunciated the
proposition on which Mr Byers thus relies, Sir Owen went on to say:
"the considerations upon which the States' title to
protection from Commonwealth control depends arise not
from the character of the powers retained by the States
but from their position as separate governments in the
system exercising independent functions .

.

. the efficacy

of the system logically demands that, unless a given
legislative power appears from its content, context or
subject matter so to intend, it should not be understood
as authorising the Commonwealth to make a law aimed
at the restriction or control of a State in the exercise of
its executive authority. In whatever way it may be
expressed an intention of this sort is .

.

. to be plainly

seen in the very frame of the Constitution." 46
The claim that there is no topic that, in a concrete case, affects or
concerns only the States (or a State) depends on the following reasoning:
because the States have no specifically reserved legislative powers,
there are no limits to the reach of Commonwealth
(a)
authority and
(b)
there are no State functions outside the reach of
Commonwealth authority.
Both parts of this reasoning are fallacious, as has been stated again and
4
again in the High Court; no need to rehearse those statements here. 1

45 Ibid 317, 318.
46 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 83.

47 See the summary review by Gibbs J in Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353,
415-425.
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United Kingdom Responsibilities Arise from the Australian
Constitution
The key to the whole matter is that the responsibilities of the United
Kingdom authorities in relation to Australia are, as they have recently
said and repeated, "a direct consequence of the established Australian
constitutional position". 48 These responsibilities are not the result of the
United Kingdom constitution as such. The Solicitor-General of the
Commonwealth forgets this when he says that in 1973, when the Queen
was petitioned by Australian States to refer a matter to the Privy
Council for an advisory opinion, United Kingdom ministers "assumed to
advise solely because of a Statute of the United Kingdom", "upon the
basis that . . . presumably the 1833 Act [Judicial Committee Act 1833]
was solely a law of the United Kingdom". 49 This speculation, about the
assumptions made by those ministers, must be considered fanciful.
After all, in June 1973, the Governments of all the Australian States
requested United Kingdom ministers to advise the Queen in relation to
the seabed petitions. The Solicitors-General of each and every Australian
State argued:
"The retention of the Privy Council as the exclusive
organ for performing the functions contemplated by
Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act is an essential
part of the constitutional structure of the Australian
States. When matters are referred to it under Section 4,
the Judicial Committee sits as a judicial organ of that
part of Her Majesty's dominions to which the question
relates. The Crown when it acts in right of [an
Australian State] acts in its constitutional capacity as
sovereign within the fields of constitutional power
exercisable by [that State]." 50
They all further argued:
"The States, as partners with the Commonwealth in a
statute-based Federal structure, assert their right to seek
to invoke the jurisdiction conferred by the Judicial
Committee Act 1833 in accordance with the longestablished convention that when Her Majesty's Ministers
in the United Kingdom tender advice to Her Majesty in
matters, which like the present Petitionfs], arise under the
Constitution of a State, they do so in strict conformity
with the genuinely federal nature of that constitutional
structure." I
It is in the highest degree unlikely that United Kingdom ministers
tendered advice on the ground, let alone "solely" on the ground, that the
48 UK, Parl, Debates, HC (1976) vol 923, col 118 (Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs - Written Answers). See likewise the Memorandum of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee, dated 11
November 1980: HC Paper 42 (1980-1981) vol 2, 61f. See also 55 ALJ 829. It is, of
course, a mistake to suppose (as does Cooray, Conventions, the Australian Constitution

and the Future (1979) 93) that because United Kingdom ministers do not wish to retain
their responsibilities, they do not retain them, or do not exercise them on their own best
judgment.
49 Supra n 44 at 316, 317.

50 Qld, Parl, PPAII (1973) 11, 33. Emphasis added. See also ibid 33, 39.
51 Ibid 36, see also ibid 22, 39.
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Judicial Committee Act 1833 is a United Kingdom statute. Rather, they
must be presumed to have tendered advice on two distinct bases:
(a)
the basis firmly argued by every Australian State, and
supported by repeated judgments in the High Court, 2 viz
that the provisions of both Imperial and State legislation
relating to this jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee are
part of the constitution of each Australian State. In this
respect, United Kingdom ministers would be tendering
advice to Her Majesty because of their residual
responsibilities in relation to the Australian States - not
because the petitions happened to be for a reference
under an Act originally enacted by the United Kingdom
Parliament.
(b)
furthermore, but secondarily, there is reason to think that
United Kingdom ministers took the view that since the
personnel and staff and facilities of the Judicial
Committee are within the United Kingdom and indeed
within the administrative responsibilities of the United
Kingdom Government, United Kingdom ministers had a
responsibility to advise Her Majesty as to the
appropriateness of exercising a discretion vested in her
where that exercise would affect those personnel, staff
and facilities.
Of these two bases for the giving of advice on the 1973 petitions, the
first is the more important and more generally applicable. As was clearly
appreciated by Commonwealth statesmen, of both parties, in 1931, 1935
and 1942, and as remains well appreciated by State and United Kingdom
authorities to this day, the significant "residual constitutional links"
between the United Kingdom and Australia are what they are, not
because imperialism or colonialism takes a long time dying, but because
it is unacceptable to suppose that the structure of Australia's federal
constitutional system could be substantially altered by some arrangement
between Canberra and Whitehall, Westminster or Buckingham Palace,
without reference to the representative governments of the States or the
people voting federally under s 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution.
The conventions and understandings (and the interpretations of
constitutional instruments) which constitute that federal constitutional
system do not rest on isolated incidents. 53 Rather they rest, to adopt
Dixon J's words, on what the efficacy of the system rationally demands.
The most potent basis for constitutional conventions and constitutional
4
responsibilities alike is their rationale.1
52-Sec especially McCawley v R (1918) 26 CLR 9, 51f, per Isaacs and Rich JJ; (1920) 28
CLR 106, 112; [19201 AC 691, 701; Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926)
37 CLR 393, 418, per Isaacs J (Rich J concurring); and since 1973 see likewise the
majority judgments in Commonwealth v Queensland (1975) 134 CLR 298, 309f and
Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1979) 27 ALR 59, 66: "The
Judicial Committee . . forms part of the judicial structure of South Australia . . ."
53 Mr Byers contends that the convention(s) in question could rest on nothing but this
1973 incident; see (1982) 56 ALJ 316, 317: "there seems to be no other [material]."
54 This is really the ratio of the majority finding of the Canadian Supreme Court, rejecting
the pretentions of the Canadian Government and Parliament to address the United
Kingdom Parliament free from any Provincial concurrence: Reference re Amendment of
the Constitution of Canada (1981) 125 DLR (3d) 1, 90, 103-107. See also UK, Parl,
Third Report on the British North America Acts: The Role of Parliament (Foreign
Affairs Committee) HC Paper 128 (1981-1982) commenting on the reasoning and
significance of the Canadian Supreme Court's judgment.

